The Power Line Dilemma: Compensation for Diminished Property Value Caused by Fear of Electromagnetic Fields by Schutt, Andrew James
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 24 | Issue 1 Article 5
1996
The Power Line Dilemma: Compensation for




Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Andrew J. Schutt, The Power Line Dilemma: Compensation for Diminished Property Value Caused by Fear of Electromagnetic Fields, 24 Fla.
St. U. L. Rev. (1996) .
http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol24/iss1/5





THE POWER LINE DILEMMA: COMPENSATION FOR DIMINISHED 



































Recommended citation: Andrew James Shutt, Comment, The Power Line Dilemma: 
Compensation for Diminished Property Value Caused by Fear of Electromagnetic Fields, 24 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 125 (1996).  
125
THE POWER LINE DILEMMA: COMPENSATION
FOR DIMINISHED PROPERTY VALUE CAUSED BY
FEAR OF ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELDS*
ANDREW JAMES SCHUTT**
I. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................... 125
II. THE THREE APPROACHES................................................................................... 130
A. The Minority View: Fear Can Never Be an Element of Damages .............. 130
1. In General............................................................................................. 130
2. The Minority View Applied: Alabama Power Co. v. Keystone Lime
Co.......................................................................................................... 130
B. The Intermediate View: Award Permissible Where Fear Depresses
Value, As Long as Fear is Reasonable........................................................ 133
1. In General............................................................................................. 133
2. The Intermediate View Applied: Dunlap v. Loup River Public Power
District ................................................................................................. 135
C. The Majority View: Reasonableness of Fear is Irrelevant—Award
Permissible Where Fear Depresses Value................................................... 136
1. In General............................................................................................. 136
2. Florida’s Reversal: Florida Power & Light Co. v. Jennings................ 137
3. New York’s Reversal: Criscuola v. Power Authority of New York....... 138
4. Kansas’s Move to the Majority View: Willsey v. Kansas City Power
& Light Co. and Ryan v. Kansas Power & Light Co........................... 139
5. Confusion in Virginia: Chappell v. Virginia Electric & Power Co...... 141
III. STRICT LIABILITY RATIONALES AS JUSTIFICATION FOR THE MAJORITY VIEW...... 142
A. Strict Liability ............................................................................................ 143
B. Corrective Justice ....................................................................................... 145
1. Causation ............................................................................................. 145
2. Reciprocity and Reasonableness .......................................................... 147
C. Economic Efficiency .................................................................................... 150
1. Reduction of Transaction Costs ........................................................... 150
2. Cost Avoidance ..................................................................................... 151
3. The Enterprise Model ........................................................................... 153
a. Loss Shifting .................................................................................. 153
b. Internalization of Costs.................................................................. 154
c. Application of the Enterprise Model .............................................. 155
IV. BALANCING INTERESTS ...................................................................................... 156
V. CONCLUSION...................................................................................................... 159
I.   INTRODUCTION
Electromagnetic field (EMF)1 litigation is fast becoming the
“asbestos of the 90s”2 as concern over the potential adverse health
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1. Electricity produces an electric field and a magnetic field, which together are
called an electromagnetic field. NATIONAL INST. OF ENVTL. HEALTH SCIENCES & U.S. DEP’T
OF ENERGY, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT EMF, ELECTRIC AND MAGNETIC FIELDS
ASSOCIATED WITH THE USE OF ELECTRIC POWER 5 (1995) [hereinafter QUESTIONS ABOUT
EMF]. EMFs are generated by power lines, electrical wiring, and such common household
items as radios, televisions, microwaves, and hair dryers. Id.; EDWIN F. FROELICH ET AL.,
EMF, ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELDS, SCIENTIFIC AND LEGAL ASPECTS 2 (1993). The strength of
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effects from EMF has spawned extensive litigation.3 With claims
arising in many forms, especially in the areas of property damage
and personal injury, a potential plaintiff has an array of legal
theories from which to choose.4 In fact, EMF litigation could be-
come more common than asbestos litigation because the preva-
lence of EMF could lead to a higher number of potential plain-
tiffs.5
EMFs are generated not only from power lines, with which
most people associate EMF, but also from such devices as micro-
wave ovens, hair dryers, and cellular telephones.6 Whether EMF
causes cancer continues to be a hotly debated question.7 Indeed,
in 1992, Congress authorized the expenditure of sixty-five million
                                                                                                             
electric and magnetic fields decreases as one moves away from the source. QUESTIONS
ABOUT EMF, supra, at 5. However, only the electric field can be eliminated by shielding in
dense objects such as walls or houses. Id. This is important because the present health
concerns about EMF revolve around the magnetic field. Id. at 6.
Most of the electricity generated by common household appliances is alternating current
(AC), meaning the flow of the current reverses periodically—in the U.S., at a frequency of
60 Hz. Id. at 5, 7. The higher the frequency, the more energy there is in the field. Id. at 7.
For example, an X-ray has a very high frequency and can cause ionization, which damages
genetic material. Id. The EMFs generated by power lines do not cause ionization, but do
create weak currents in people and animals. Id. at 9.
2. George Brandon, Defending Against EMF Property Devaluation Cases, PUB. UTIL.
REP., Feb. 1, 1995, at 43. In the 1970s and 1980s, the United States saw a large amount of
litigation involving asbestos, with asbestos manufacturers and their insurers incurring
costs in the billions of dollars. See generally BARRY L. CASTLEMAN, ASBESTOS: MEDICAL AND
LEGAL ASPECTS 666-676 (3d ed. 1990) (summarizing costs of asbestos litigation to manu-
facturers and insurance industry).
3. FROELICH ET AL., supra note 1, at 2.
4. See FROELICH ET AL., supra note 1, at 24-25 (summarizing EMF litigation theories
and noting that both property damage and personal injury claims take many forms, in-
cluding “trespass, conversion, nuisance, and undue burden upon the easements granted for
the routing of lines” among the former and “negligence, product liability, and ultrahazard-
ous activity” among the latter).
5. See Tom Watson & Curtis S. Renner, The Scientific and Legal Bases for Litigating
EMF Property Cases, in CURRENT CONDEMNATION LAW 126 (Alan T. Ackerman ed., 1994)
(“[T]he potential impact from EMF property damage claims could ‘dwarf ’ the impact seen
from asbestos litigation.”); Roy W. Krieger, On the Line, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1994, at 40 (“We
live surrounded by electromagnetic fields. Some say they are deadly. With these fields all
around us, the litigation potential could dwarf the asbestos claims of the past decade.”).
6. FROELICH ET AL., supra note 1, at 2.
7. Compare William J. Broad, Cancer Fear is Unfounded, Physicists Say, N.Y.
TIMES, May 14, 1995, at 19 (discussing study by the American Physical Society which
stated that “it [could] find no evidence that the electromagnetic fields that radiate from
power lines cause cancer”) and Amicus Brief at 4, San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Orange Co.
Superior Court, 895 P.2d 56 (Cal. 1995) (No. S045854) (stating that studies do not
“demonstrate a causal association between electromagnetic fields and cancer”) with Nancy
Wertheimer & Ed Leeper, Electrical Wiring Configurations and Childhood Cancer, 109
AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 2273-84 (1979) (arguing that there is an increase in the rate of
childhood leukemia in homes located near power lines). See also QUESTIONS ABOUT EMF,
supra note 1, at 57-63 (listing studies of the potential health effects caused by EMF); Mo-
hammad Harunuzzaman & Govindarajan Iyyuni, Electromagnetic Fields and Human
Health: Revisiting the Issue, 16 NAT’L REG. Q. BULL. 181, 182-88 (1995) (same).
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dollars over a five-year period for an EMF research and public in-
formation program.8 However, many in the scientific community
only agree that “there may be a connection between EMF expo-
sure and some forms of cancer.”9
An issue of significant litigation, especially in recent years, is
whether property owners may be compensated for the diminution
in value of their land caused by the public’s fear of EMF emanat-
ing from power lines.10 This issue arises most often in condemna-
tion proceedings brought by power companies seeking to install
new power lines over a portion of property owners’ land.11 The
property owners claim that the land has been partially “taken”12
                                                                                                             
8. See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-486, 102 Stat. 2776 (codified at 42
U.S.C.A. § 13478 (1994)). This Act created the Electric and Magnetic Fields Research and
Public Information Dissemination (EMF RAPID) program. QUESTIONS ABOUT EMF, supra
note 1, at 64. The EMF RAPID program’s central purpose is determining whether EMF
causes cancer and providing the public with information about EMF. Id. at 1, 65. Ques-
tions About EMF was prepared for the EMF RAPID program and provides answers to
questions about EMF. Id. at 1. A copy can be purchased from the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington DC 20402. The EMF RAPID pro-
gram also provides a toll-free number to answer EMF-related questions: 1-800-363-2383.
9. Robert D. Chesler & Peter E. Nahmias, The Next Wave? EMF Regulation and
Litigation, MEALEY’S LIT. REP. (TOXIC TORTS), Oct. 21, 1994, at 23 (emphasis added).
10. This Comment focuses on the EMF issue in terms of the fear of power lines and
subsequent land value diminution caused by that fear. This is the context in which fear-
based land value diminution arises most often and presumably will continue to arise, es-
pecially in light of increased public awareness and fear of EMF. Pipeline cases are the sec-
ond most common scenario under which public fear may create a land value diminution.
See James W. Springer & David G. Mawn, Condemnation Law: Can a Landowner Recover
for Damages Due to the Improvement?, 22 REAL EST. L.J. 281, 287-88 (1994); see, e.g., Will-
sey v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 631 P.2d 268, 273-75 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981) (power
line condemnation suit; summary of case law); All Am. Pipeline Co. v. Ammerman, 814
S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (pipeline condemnation suit). Public fear causing value
diminution arises in other situations, however. For example, in City of Santa Fe v. Komis,
845 P.2d 753 (N.M. 1992), the New Mexico Supreme Court analyzed the issue in reference
to a condemnation proceeding brought for the construction of a highway to transport nu-
clear waste. The landowner in Komis attempted to recover for diminution of the property’s
value caused by the public’s fear of potential dangers from the nuclear waste. Id. at 755;
see also infra note 96 (discussing Komis); Department of Agric. & Consumer Serv. v. Polk,
568 So. 2d 35, 41 (Fla. 1990) (noting that evidence of diminution in market value caused by
public’s fear of orange trees from infected nursery was relevant in determining damages in
inverse condemnation suit); Horsch v. Terminix Int’l Co., Ltd. Partnership, 865 P.2d 1044,
1049 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993) (involving civil action by private homeowner against termite
company; homeowner was entitled to damages for reduction in market value caused by
public’s fear of houses with prior termite damage). Thus, while this Comment focuses on
power lines, its analysis and conclusions are meant to apply to most factual scenarios in
which public fear creates a diminution in value.
11. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Jennings, 518 So. 2d 895, 896 (Fla. 1987)
(involving utility company condemnation of portion of property owner’s land, of which
owner retained some use); Selective Resources v. Superior Court, 700 P.2d 849, 850 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1984) (noting that pertinent valuation determination in easement condemnation
proceeding was value of land taken for power line and power line’s effect on market value
of remaining land).
12. Eminent domain provides that if the government takes private property for a
public use, the landowner must be justly compensated. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall
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and assert that the public’s fear that power lines cause cancer
has decreased the remaining property’s market value.13 It is also
conceivable that adjacent property owners could have a claim, al-
beit a less direct one.14 While the former owner can seek compen-
sation in a condemnation proceeding for the value lost,15 the lat-
ter owner could file claims of inverse condemnation, nuisance,
trespass, strict liability, or ultrahazardous activities.16 In either
situation, a court must decide whether a diminution in the prop-
erty’s value caused by the public’s fear is compensable.
The jurisdictions that have addressed the issue of compensa-
bility for damages caused by the public’s fear have followed three
approaches.17 The first, labeled the minority view,18 holds that
damages caused by the public’s fear are never compensable.19 The
second, labeled the intermediate view,20 holds that damages
caused by the public’s reasonable fear may be compensable.21 Fi-
                                                                                                             
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”). State legislatures
allow power companies to utilize the power of eminent domain for the erection of power
lines. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 361.01 (1995); IND. CODE § 8-1-8-1 (1995). If a power company
or other governmental agency wants to implement eminent domain proceedings, the entity
must seek to have the property condemned. See WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK, NONTRESPASSORY
TAKINGS IN EMINENT DOMAIN 4 (1977). Every state except North Carolina has a similar
provision in its constitution. Id. at 5-6. However, North Carolina provides for eminent do-
main proceedings through its supreme court. Id. at 6. In condemnation proceedings, land-
owners are usually awarded damages for the property taken and consequential damages
for the diminished value of the remaining property. Id. at 18-19.
13. See, e.g., Gary A. Thorton, Litigation Involving High-Power Electrical Transmission
Line Cases, in CURRENT CONDEMNATION LAW 118-19 (Alan T. Ackerman ed., 1994) (“In the
past, people viewed electricity and the high-power lines that supplied it as a blessing. The op-
posite viewpoint is more common today. High-power lines are now more often seen as an eye-
sore at best and, at worst, as potentially dangerous, cancer-causing, or posing latent health
risks.”). This fear has developed in part because of the publicity surrounding studies that
purport to show a correlation between EMF and cancer. See Chesler & Nahmias, supra note
9, at 20-21; Margo R. Stoffel, Comment, Electromagnetic Fields and Cancer: A Legitimate Cause
of Action or a Result of Media-Influenced Fear?, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 551, 587-90 (1994)
(summarizing media’s role in shaping public perception by encouraging fear of power lines).
14. See, e.g., Adkins v. Thomas Solvent Co., 487 N.W.2d 715 (Mich. 1992) (involving
nuisance claim for property value depreciation caused by public concern about contamina-
tion emanating from defendant’s property); see also infra note 74 (discussing Adkins).
15. See Jennings, 518 So. 2d at 895; see also Selective Resources, 700 P.2d at 850.
16. See, e.g., Adkins, 487 N.W.2d at 717. See also Chesler & Nahmias, supra note 9,
at 24 (“The nature of EMF lends itself to recovery under theories of nuisance, trespass and
inverse condemnation.”); Todd D. Brown, The Power Line Plaintiff & the Inverse Condem-
nation Alternative, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 655, 681-90 (1992) (discussing possible
claims for EMF exposure and suggesting that inverse condemnation suit on various theo-
ries, such as nuisance or airspace easement, might result in compensation for lost market
value caused by public’s fear).
17. See Chesler & Nahmias, supra note 9, at 24.
18. Willsey v. Kansas City Power, 631 P.2d 268, 273 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981).
19. See infra notes 32-56 and accompanying text.
20. Willsey, 631 P.2d at 273.
21. See infra notes 57-83 and accompanying text.
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nally, the third approach, labeled the majority view,22 holds that
damages caused by the public’s fear are always compensable.23
This area of law is confusing and unsettled.24 There is no uni-
form approach to the issue, and there are variations of the three
main approaches.25 Moreover, in recent years, several courts have
either reversed precedent and switched views, or cast doubt upon
the state of law in their respective jurisdictions. The Florida Su-
preme Court reversed years of precedent by switching from the
minority view to the majority view.26 New York and Kansas
switched from the intermediate view to the majority view.27 Vir-
ginia’s highest court recently decided a case that casts doubt
upon that state’s position.28 This lack of consistency, coupled with
the array of views on this issue, is a legal quagmire, with no end
to the confusion in sight.29 Courts30 and commentators31 offer
many different justifications for why a particular view is supe-
rior.
Part II of this Comment attempts to summarize the current
state of the law on the issue of fear-based land value diminution
by examining relevant case law. Part III argues that the majority
view is superior to the minority and intermediate views. This
part demonstrates that the majority view is essentially a strict li-
                                                                                                             
22. Willsey, 631 P.2d at 273.
23. See infra notes 84-136 and accompanying text.
24. See infra note 61 (discussing further the confusion in this area).
25. For example, Arizona follows the intermediate view, but has modified the analy-
sis. See Selective Resources v. Superior Court, 700 P.2d 849 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984); see also
infra note 75 (discussing Selective Resources).
26. See infra notes 102-09 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 110-28 and accompanying text.
28. It is now unclear whether Virginia has moved from the majority view to the in-
termediate view. See infra notes 129-36 and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., Florida Power & Light Co. v. Jennings, 518 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 1987)
(reversing Casey v. Florida Power Corp., 157 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963)); Criscuola v.
Power Auth. of N.Y., 621 N.E.2d 1195 (N.Y. 1993) (reversing Zappavigna v. New York, 588
N.Y.S.2d 585 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992)); Ryan v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 815 P.2d 528
(Kan. 1991) (explicitly adopting majority view, yet citing earlier court of appeals decision
for proposition that Kansas followed intermediate view); Chappell v. Virginia Elec. &
Power Co., 458 S.E.2d 282 (Va. 1995) (casting doubt upon whether Virginia courts should
follow majority or intermediate view). See also infra note 61 (discussing further the confu-
sion in this area).
30. See Jennings, 518 So. 2d at 895 (discussing majority view arguments); Heddin v.
Delhi Gas Pipeline Co., 522 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. 1975) (discussing intermediate view argu-
ments); Pappas v. Alabama Power Co., 119 So. 2d 899 (Ala. 1960) (discussing minority
view arguments).
31. See Linda J. Orel, Perceived Risks of EMFs and Landowner Compensation, 6
RISK: HEALTH SAFETY & ENV’T 79 (1995); Stoffel, supra note 13, at 582; Philip S. McCune,
Note, The Power Line Health Controversy: Legal Problems and Proposals for Reform, 24 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 429 (1991); David Z. Kaufman, Comment, Efficient Compensation for Lost
Market Value Due to Fear of Electric Transmission Lines, 12 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 711
(1990).
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ability approach, and suggests that the justifications for imposing
strict liability upon an actor also support imposing upon power
companies the cost of compensating property owners for losses
caused by the public’s fear of EMF health hazards. Part IV notes
that in situations where the majority view may be inappropriate,
courts or legislatures can create exceptions. Finally, Part V con-
cludes that the majority view is the superior approach to deter-
mining damages caused by fear of EMF.
II.   THE THREE APPROACHES
A.   The Minority View: Fear Can Never Be an Element of
Damages
1.   In General
The minority view holds that because fear is inherently sub-
jective, damages are inappropriate even if the public’s fear causes
a reduction in the property’s market value.32 Only three jurisdic-
tions follow this view: Alabama,33 Illinois,34 and West Virginia.35
2.   The Minority View Applied: Alabama Power Co. v.
Keystone Lime Co.
In 1914, the Alabama Supreme Court first addressed the issue
of compensation for damages caused by fear in Alabama Power
Co. v. Keystone Lime Co. 36 The court held that compensation for
diminution of property value in a condemnation proceeding is not
permissible when the public’s fear causes the diminution.37 The
property owner in Keystone Lime  argued that people would be
afraid to farm or work the land adjacent to the power line,38 and
thus this fear devalued the land because it would be difficult to
find a willing buyer.39 The court noted that many people were un-
accustomed to power lines and afraid of them, and therefore
would not purchase the property.40 The court did not allow an
award of damages for the diminution, however, noting that it was
                                                                                                             
32. See, e.g., Alabama Power Co. v. Keystone Lime Co., 67 So. 833, 835 (Ala. 1914).
33. See id. at 833; see also Pappas, 119 So. 2d at 899.
34. See Central Ill. Light Co. v. Nierstheimer, 185 N.E.2d 841 (Ill. 1962).
35. See Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Red Jacket Consol. Coal & Coke Co., 121
S.E. 278 (W. Va. Ct. App. 1924).
36. 67 So. 833 (Ala. 1914) (concerning condemnation proceeding for erection of power line).
37. Id. at 835.
38. See id. at 833-34.
39. Id. at 834-35, 837.
40. Id. at 837.
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caused by “the mere fears of some of the people, which are
founded in reality upon their lack of knowledge of the real effect
of the line, and which human experience shows is not justified by
the facts.”41 The court’s reason for denying the property owner
compensation for this loss centered around the irrationality of the
public’s fear.42 The court found that electricity was of great social
value and possessed a risk no greater than that of other tech-
nologies:
Having no actual knowledge of the practical operation and ef-
fect of such lines, [the public] may, as some of the testimony
tends to show, be afraid of the property on which the lines are
situated. A large percentage of the agencies which now con-
serve human effort are, when negligently controlled, dangerous
to human life, and many things now daily used upon our
streets and upon our public highways were, when they were
first introduced, objects of terror to those who knew nothing
about them. When the automobile was first introduced, espe-
cially in our towns, villages, and country neighborhoods, the
driver . . . was known to be in possession of a dangerous in-
strument.43
The court concluded that it could not regard land value diminu-
tion created by fear as resting upon any substantial basis.44
The Alabama Supreme Court revisited the issue forty-six
years later in Pappas v. Alabama Power Co. 45 In determining the
damages award, the Pappas court similarly held that the prop-
erty owner could not recover damages caused by the public’s fear
of the power lines.46 The court stated: “The reasoning of [Keystone
Lime] is sound and probably even more necessary in this modern
age of scientific and industrial expansion.”47
The Alabama Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed Key-
stone Lime.48 For example, in Alabama Electric Cooperative, Inc.
v. Faust,49 the Alabama Supreme Court responded to a property
                                                                                                             
41. Id. The court placed great emphasis on testimony offered to show that power lines
are safe to humans and the environment. Id. at 833-34.
42. Id. at 837.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 835, 837.
45. 119 So. 2d 899 (Ala. 1960). Pappas was another condemnation proceeding brought
by the Alabama Power Co. to erect power lines upon a property owner’s land. See id. at
902.
46. Id. at 905.
47. Id.
48. See Alabama Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Faust, 574 So. 2d 734, 735 (Ala. 1990); Deramus
v. Alabama Power Co., 265 So. 2d 609, 614 (Ala. 1972); Southern Elec. Generating Co. v.
Howard, 156 So. 2d 359, 362 (Ala. 1963).
49. 574 So. 2d 734 (Ala. 1990).
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owner’s request to expand the Keystone Lime rule by stating: “We
decline so to do, for such a modification would materially change
the established rule of damages relating to eminent domain
cases. Although this Court is receptive to change where compel-
ling reasons are advanced for making a change, we find no ra-
tional basis for changing the rule here challenged.”50 Other juris-
dictions have not been as inclined to follow precedent, and have
not hesitated to change years (or even decades) of established
case law.51
Both Illinois and West Virginia follow the minority view.52 Illi-
nois applies a different rationale than that of Alabama, relying
upon its supreme court’s state constitutional analysis limiting the
just compensation rule to property taken.53 The Illinois court rea-
soned that there must be direct physical disturbance of a right,
and thus “depreciation in market value will not, alone, sustain a
claim for damages. The depreciation must be from a cause which
the law regards as a basis for damages.”54
Illinois appears to be moving away from the minority view,
however. Illinois courts used to cite the above reasoning in refus-
ing to allow landowners to recover for lost market value caused
                                                                                                             
50. Id. at 736.
51. See, e.g., Florida Power & Light Co. v. Jennings, 518 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 1987)
(changing rule in Florida from minority view, established in 1963, to majority view).
52. See Central Ill. Light Co. v. Nierstheimer, 185 N.E.2d 841, 843 (Ill. 1962)
(summarizing Illinois law on issue of proper elements of damages and noting that
“imagined sources of danger . . . [are] so remote and speculative and uncertain as to afford
no basis for the allowance of damages”); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Red Jacket
Consol. Coal & Coke Co., 121 S.E. 278, 280 (W. Va. Ct. App. 1924) (“[D]angers which
lessen the value of [property] may be considered in the ascertainment of damages; but . . .
such dangers must be real, imminent and reasonably to be apprehended,—not remote or
merely possible.”).
Florida also followed the minority view until its supreme court reversed precedent and
decided to follow the majority view. See infra notes 102-09 and accompanying text. Before
the Florida Supreme Court’s adoption of the majority view, Florida courts cited Casey v.
Florida Power Corp., 157 So. 2d 168, 170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963), as the seminal case in Flor-
ida. The Casey court, in deciding to follow what it misstated as the majority view but what
was actually the minority view, reasoned:
That a prospective purchaser of the land . . . will be so timid or so ignorant
that he either will not buy at all or will offer less than the true value because of
the transmission lines and towers is too highly speculative . . . to be taken into
consideration. This court, like the majority of other courts, recognizes the own-
ers’ right to full and just compensation; but when a jury must base its award
upon ignorance and fear, we must draw the line; such a basis cannot possibly
result in fair and just compensation.
Id. at 170-71. The Florida Supreme Court subsequently reversed the Casey decision in
Jennings, 518 So. 2d at 897. The Jennings court stated that the minority view ignored the
key issue in eminent domain and condemnation proceedings, i.e., compensation to the
landowner for the lost market value caused by the taking. Id.
53. Illinois Power & Light Co. v. Talbott, 152 N.E. 486, 489 (Ill. 1926).
54. Id. at 490.
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by the unsightliness of power lines.55 The Illinois Supreme Court
has since receded from this view and now allows landowners to
recover for this loss.56 Whether the Illinois court will expand its
approach and allow landowners to recover for the lost market
value caused by the public’s fear of power lines is still unclear.
B.   The Intermediate View: Award Permissible Where Fear
Depresses Value, As Long as Fear is Reasonable
1.   In General
Jurisdictions following the intermediate view hold that as long
as the public’s fear is reasonable, or at least not completely un-
reasonable, a damages award is permissible when the fear de-
presses market value.57 These jurisdictions usually require expert
testimony from a real estate appraiser or similar expert; the
landowner cannot personally testify as to his or her own fears.58
For example, a landowner cannot testify that he or she is afraid
of power lines and thinks that a purchaser of his or her land
would feel the same way.59
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit60 and twelve
states follow the intermediate view.61 Those states are: Arkan-
                                                                                                             
55. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co. v. Hoffman, 468 N.E.2d 977, 980 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
56. Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Westervelt, 367 N.E.2d 661, 663 (Ill. 1977). See also
Hoffman, 468 N.E.2d at 980 (agreeing with Illinois Supreme Court’s move away from pol-
icy of not allowing compensation for unsightliness and noting that earlier policy was
probably “based upon a conclusion that such damage was speculative and largely unquan-
tifiable.”).
57. Heddin v. Delhi Gas Pipeline Co., 522 S.W.2d 886, 888 (Tex. 1975). The reasoning
of the intermediate view was enunciated in Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246 (1934). In
Olson, the U.S. Supreme Court held that elements in a condemnation proceeding “that de-
pend upon events or combinations of occurrences which, while within the realm of possibil-
ity, are not fairly shown to be reasonably probable should be excluded from consideration
for that would be to allow mere speculation and conjecture to become a guide for the ascer-
tainment of value . . . .” Id. at 257.
58. See, e.g., Gulledge v. Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 256 S.W.2d 349, 353 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1952).
59. Id.
60. United States v. 760.807 Acres of Land, 731 F.2d 1443, 1447 (9th Cir. 1984)
(applying federal common law). The argument could be made that the Ninth Circuit fol-
lows the majority view. Specifically, the 760.807 Acres court stated: “[I]f fear of a hazard
would affect the price a knowledgeable and prudent buyer would pay to a similarly well-
informed seller, diminution in value caused by that fear may be recoverable as part of just
compensation.” Id. at 1447. The court went on to note, however, that damages for fears
based wholly upon speculation are impermissible: “[F]ears must be ‘reasonable’ or ‘founded
on practical experience’ in order to be compensable.” Id.
61. In addition to the diverse number of approaches to the issue of whether property
owners may be compensated for diminution due to fear, courts and commentators also
disagree as to which states follow the majority or intermediate views. Compare Willsey v.
Kansas City Power & Light Co., 631 P.2d 268, 273-75 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981) (asserting that
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sas,62 Connecticut,63 Indiana,64 Kentucky,65 Nebraska,66 New Jer-
sey,67 North Carolina,68 Oklahoma,69 Tennessee,70 Texas,71 Utah,72
and Wyoming.73 The Michigan Supreme Court appears willing to
                                                                                                             
Arkansas, Indiana, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Virginia adopted majority view) with
McCune, supra note 31, at 434-35 nn.25-26 (asserting that those states adopted interme-
diate view). The Willsey court asserted that those states adopted the majority view because
the courts in those states assumed the reasonableness of the fear of power lines. McCune,
supra note 31, at 434 n.25. Those courts still required a showing of reasonableness, how-
ever. See id. Therefore, this Comment includes all but Virginia among states taking the in-
termediate view. Virginia is listed as a majority-view state because language in the case
cited by Willsey, see Appalachian Power Co. v. Johnson, 119 S.E. 253 (Va. 1923), was read
for the proposition that property owners could recover for diminution caused by the pub-
lic’s fear in a subsequent Virginia Supreme Court decision, see Chappell v. Virginia Elec. &
Power Co., 458 S.E.2d 282 (Va. 1995). In that same decision, however, Virginia called that
language dictum and appeared to be willing to adopt the intermediate view. See infra
notes 129-36 and accompanying text.
The confusion in this area of law is heightened by courts mislabeling views. E.g., Casey
v. Florida Power Corp., 157 So. 2d 168, 170-71 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963) (incorrectly labeling ap-
proach that damages caused by public fear are never compensable as “majority view”);
Ryan v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 815 P.2d 528, 533-34 (Kan. 1991) (same).
62. See Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Haskins, 528 S.W.2d 407, 409 (Ark. 1975)
(“Apprehension of danger [from power lines] is very reasonable.”).
63. See Northeastern Gas Transmission Co. v. Tersana Acres, Inc., 134 A.2d 253
(Conn. 1957).
64. See Southern Ind. Gas and Elec. Co. v. Gerhardt, 172 N.E.2d 204, 206 (Ind. 1961)
(holding that jury may consider effect upon market value of fears caused by possibility that
power lines may break or fall during storms, “[i]f such possibilities exist”).
65. See Gulledge v. Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 256 S.W.2d 349 (Ky. 1959).
66. See Dunlap v. Loup River Pub. Power Dist., 284 N.W. 742 (Neb. 1939).
67. See Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Maze, 133 A.2d 28 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1957).
68. See Colvard v. Natahala Power & Light Co., 167 S.E. 472, 475 (N.C. 1933)
(property owner may recover for lost market value caused by fear of power lines where
such fear “sensibly impairs its value”) (quoting Carolina & Yadkin River R.R. v. Armfield,
83 S.E. 809, 811 (N.C. 1914)) (emphasis added).
69. See Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co. v. Kelly, 58 P.2d 328, 329 (Okla. 1936) (holding
that it is proper to consider things that “sensibly” impair value in determining condemna-
tion proceeding damages). There is room in Kelly to allow a future Oklahoma court to
adopt the majority view. The Kelly court noted that while it would not allow recovery
solely on speculative matters such as potential danger from power lines, it would “allow
such hazards to be taken into consideration as affecting the market value of the land.” Id.
70. See Hodge v. Southern Cities Power Co., 8 Tenn. App. 636 (1928); see also Alloway
v. Nashville, 13 S.W. 123 (Tenn. 1890).
71. See Delhi Gas Pipeline Co. v. Reid, 488 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972); see also
Heddin v. Delhi Gas Pipeline Co., 522 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. 1975).
72. See Telluride Power Co. v. Bruneau, 125 P. 399 (Utah 1912).
73. See Canyon View Ranch v. Basin Elec. Power Corp., 628 P.2d 530 (Wyo. 1981).
Canyon View Ranch involved an appeal by several property owners from damages awards
made to them in a condemnation proceeding brought for the erection of a power line. Id. at
531. The Wyoming Supreme Court endorsed the trial court’s instruction to the jury that in
determining damages to the property, “any factors which you consider must be direct and
certain and may not be remote, imaginary, or speculative.” Id. at 534, 541. The supreme
court went on to hold that there was no error in refusing to allow the property owners to
introduce into evidence magazine articles about the hazards of power lines. Id. at 536-37.
The property owners had offered the articles to show that the property was further deval-
ued because prospective purchasers, aware of the information within the articles, would
find the property less desirable. Id. at 535-36. The court reasoned that because the prop-
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follow the intermediate view,74 and Arizona follows a modified
version of this rule.75 Moreover, after a recent decision by its su-
preme court, Virginia appears to be leaning toward the interme-
diate view.76
2.   The Intermediate View Applied: Dunlap v. Loup River
Public Power District
Dunlap v. Loup River Public Power District 77 illustrates the in-
termediate view. In Dunlap, the plaintiff’s expert witness testi-
fied to the dangers inherent in power lines, including the dangers
to individuals coming within the general vicinity of the power
lines.78 The Loup River Public Power District objected to the trial
judge’s jury instructions, which allowed consideration of the pos-
sible dangers of power lines.79
The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s
award of damages to the landowner.80 The court reasoned that
while general fears should not be compensable, if there is a basis
in experience for the fears, and the fears are reasonable and af-
fect the price a purchaser of land is willing to pay, the loss should
be compensable.81 The court, however, reduced the damages
                                                                                                             
erty owner made no effort to prove the credibility of the information in the articles, the
evidence was speculative. Id. at 537.
74. See Adkins v. Thomas Solvent Co., 487 N.W.2d 715, 721 (Mich. 1992). In Adkins,
the Michigan Supreme Court held that landowners could not recover in nuisance for prop-
erty value diminution that was caused by the public’s fear that contamination on the de-
fendant’s land might reach the landowners’ property. Id. The majority specifically disa-
greed with the dissent. Id. at 726. The dissent would have held that the landowners could
have recovered solely because their property had been devalued. Id. at 744-45. The major-
ity held that “unfounded fears” could not be a basis for recovery. Id. at 726. The majority
also noted that the case came to the court “singularly on the issue whether plaintiffs may
proceed with their nuisance in fact claims solely on the basis of property depreciation due
to public concern about contaminants in the general area.” Id. n.34. The majority then
held that the plaintiffs could not proceed. Id.
75. See Selective Resources v. Superior Court, 700 P.2d 849 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984). Se-
lective Resources held that proof of actual knowledge of the effect of power lines on the part
of the buying public is not needed. Id. at 852. Instead, a landowner can recover based upon
the theory of a hypothetical buyer, who is assumed to know all facts relevant to the pur-
chase. Id.
76. See infra notes 129-36 and accompanying text.
77. 284 N.W. 742 (Neb. 1939). Dunlap involved the Loup River Public Power District’s
application for an easement to construct a power line over the landowner’s dairy farm. Id.
at 743.
78. Id. at 744-45. The plaintiff’s expert testified that “a man on a load of hay would be
partially grounded, and if he had a pitchfork in his hand he could receive a shock that
might endanger his life.” Id. at 744.
79. Id. at 745. “It is insisted by the power district that it is not an insurer against the
dangers arising from [power lines].” Id. at 746.
80. Id. at 746.
81. Id. at 745.
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award,82 reasoning that it was necessary to curb over-imaginative
speculation about dangers from power lines in condemnation pro-
ceedings.83
C.   The Majority View: Reasonableness of Fear is Irrelevant—
Award Permissible Where Fear Depresses Value
1.   In General
Jurisdictions following the majority view hold that the rea-
sonableness of the public’s fear is irrelevant: if the public’s fear
depresses market value, the loss is compensable.84 This view is
premised upon the argument that the issue in eminent domain
proceedings is full compensation.85 Thus, if fear of power lines
causes a loss of market value, that loss should be compen-
sated.86
The U. S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth87 and Sixth88 Cir-
cuits follow the majority view, as do thirteen states: Califor-
nia,89 Florida,90 Georgia,91 Iowa,92 Kansas,93 Louisiana,94 Mis-
                                                                                                             
82. Id. at 746.
83. Id.
84. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Jennings, 518 So. 2d 895, 899 (Fla. 1987).
85. Id. Of course, not all takings result in full compensation or any compensation at
all. For example, with regulatory takings, value is taken away from property by some ac-
tion of the government, but the landowner is not necessarily awarded compensation. See
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). The standard is whether
the regulation has eliminated either all economically viable use of the property or the
property owner’s investment-backed expectations. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992).
86. Jennings, 518 So. 2d at 899.
87. See United States ex rel. TVA v. Robertson, 354 F.2d 877 (5th Cir. 1966) (applying
16 U.S.C. § 831).
88. See United States ex rel. TVA v. Easement and Right of Way, 405 F.2d 305 (6th
Cir. 1968) (applying 16 U.S.C. § 831).
89. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. W.H. Hunt Estate Co., 319 P.2d 1044 (Cal. 1957);
see also San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Daley, 253 Cal. Rptr. 144 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
90. See Jennings, 518 So. 2d at 895.
91. See Georgia Power Co. v. Sinclair, 176 S.E.2d 639, 642 (Ga. Ct. App. 1970)
(holding that “[p]otential danger of an electric power line . . . necessarily has a material
connection with the market value of the adjacent land and is an item to be considered by
the jury . . . .”).
92. See Evans v. Iowa S. Utils. Co., 218 N.W. 66, 69 (Iowa 1928) (holding that it was
proper for expert to consider as one of the damage elements in a condemnation proceeding
“the fear prospective purchasers might have by reason of the high voltage line being on the
premises.”). But see Iowa Power & Light Co. v. Stortenbecker, 334 N.W.2d 326 (Iowa App.
1983) (holding that trial court improperly allowed expert testimony offered to illustrate ef-
fects fear of health hazards from power lines might have upon market value of property
“because insufficient data existed for [the expert] to reach a conclusion that a reasonable
probability of hazards to human health is created by the [power line].”).
93. See Ryan v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 815 P.2d 528 (Kan. 1991).
94. See Claiborne Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Garrett, 357 So. 2d 1251 (La. Ct. App. 1978),
writ denied, 359 So. 2d 1306 (La. 1978).
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souri,95 New Mexico,96 New York,97 Ohio,98 South Dakota,99 Vir-
ginia,100 and Washington.101
2.   Florida’s Reversal: Florida Power & Light Co. v. Jennings
The Florida Supreme Court reversed twenty-four years of
precedent in Florida Power & Light Co. v. Jennings 102 by overrul-
ing Casey v. Florida Power Corp. 103 In Casey, the Florida Second
District Court of Appeal announced that it would follow the ma-
jority view; however, it actually meant the minority view.104 In
Jennings, the Florida Supreme Court declined to follow Casey,
noting that the issue in eminent domain proceedings should be to
determine the true market value of the land taken.105 Evidence
“extremely relevant to the central issue of what is full compensa-
tion to the landowner,” such as the impact of a potential buyer’s
fears on the land’s value, should not be excluded.106 The court also
                                                                                                             
95. For a number of years, Missouri was thought to adhere to the intermediate view.
See Willsey v. Kansas City Power, 631 P.2d 268, 275 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981) (citing Phillips
Pipe Line Co. v. Ashley, 605 S.W.2d 514, 517-18 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980)). However, the Mis-
souri Supreme Court subsequently adopted the majority view, even though it did not ex-
plicitly overrule Phillips Pipe Line. See Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Juergens, 760 S.W.2d
105, 106-07 (Mo. 1988) (en banc). In Juergens, the court held that “depreciation in market
value due to a risk of harm is recoverable in a condemnation hearing. . . . ‘[I]t is the fear
caused by the risk which actually depreciates the value of the remaining tract, rather than
the risk itself.’ ” Id. (quoting Phillips Pipe Line, 605 S.W.2d at 518). Interestingly, the
Juergens court relied upon Phillips Pipe Line, but only cited language from that opinion
that supported the majority view. Id.; see also Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm’n v.
Horine, 776 S.W.2d 6, 12 (Mo. 1989) (en banc) (adhering to same reasoning and holding as
Juergens court).
96. See City of Santa Fe v. Komis, 845 P.2d 753 (N.M. 1992) (action to recover for
diminution of property value caused by construction of highway to transport nuclear
waste). After reviewing this case of first impression, the New Mexico Supreme Court con-
sidered the three primary viewpoints and adopted the majority view, reasoning that “[the]
objective in a condemnation case is to compensate the landowner for damages actually suf-
fered. . . . [I]f loss of value can be proven, it should be compensable regardless of its
source.” Id. at 756.
97. See Criscuola v. Power Auth. of N.Y., 621 N.E.2d 1195 (N.Y. 1993); see also infra
notes 110-14 and accompanying text (discussing Criscuola).
98. See Ohio Pub. Serv. Co. v. Dehring, 172 N.E. 448 (Ohio Ct. App. 1929).
99. See Basin Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v. Cutler, 217 N.W.2d 798, 800 (S.D. 1974)
(holding that qualified witnesses in eminent domain proceeding can opine “as to [the prop-
erty’s] value and to also state the factors they considered in arriving at a depreciation in
value even though some of those factors were in the nature of conjecture”).
100. See Appalachian Power Co. v. Johnson, 119 S.E. 253 (Va. 1923). But see infra
notes 129-36 and accompanying text.
101. See State v. Evans, 612 P.2d 442 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980), rev’d on other grounds,
634 P.2d 845 (Wash. 1981), modified, 649 P.2d 633 (Wash. 1982).
102. 518 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 1987).
103. 157 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963).
104. Id. at 170-71; see also supra note 52 (discussing Casey court’s rationale for follow-
ing minority view).
105. Jennings, 518 So. 2d at 897. But see supra note 85.
106. Jennings, 518 So. 2d at 897.
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rejected the intermediate view, which the lower court had
adopted.107
The Jennings court thus adopted the majority view: “We join
the majority of jurisdictions who have considered this issue and
hold that the impact of public fear on the market value of the
property is admissible without independent proof of the reason-
ableness of the fear.”108 The court stated that the reasonableness
of the public’s fear either should be assumed or considered irrele-
vant.109
3.   New York’s Reversal: Criscuola v. Power Authority of New
York
New York adopted the majority view in 1993, when its highest
court overruled a lower court decision that had endorsed the in-
termediate view. In Criscuola v. Power Authority of New York ,110
the New York Court of Appeals decided whether landowners in a
condemnation suit have to prove the reasonableness of the pub-
lic’s fear of power lines “as a separate, additional component of
diminished market value.”111 The lower courts had ruled against
the claimants, holding that they “had not met their burden of
proving that the ‘cancerphobia’ was reasonable.”112
The Criscuola court held that the landowners need not prove
the reasonableness of the public’s fear. The court noted:
The issue in a just compensation proceeding is whether or not
the market value has been adversely affected. This conse-
quence may be present even if the public’s fear is unreasonable.
Whether the danger is a scientifically genuine or verifiable fact
should be irrelevant to the central issue of its market value im-
pact. Genuineness and proportionate dollar effects are relevant
factors, to be sure, but in the usual evidentiary framework.
                                                                                                             
107. Id.
108. Id. at 898.
109. Id. at 899. The court made reasonableness a matter of fact instead of a matter of
law. See id. The court stated that the jury is capable of determining the reasonableness of
an expert’s testimony and noted: “[W]e believe that a jury could also determine the reason-
ableness of a valuation opinion which explains the devaluation of such adjacent property
on the grounds that, e.g., the buying public is fearful that transmission lines attract alien
being[s] in flying saucers.” Id. The court opined that whether an expert’s opinion is rea-
sonable can be determined by the jury without additional experts testifying as to the rea-
sonableness of a particular fear. Id.; see also Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Juergens, 760
S.W.2d 105, 106 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) (holding that “[t]he weight to be given evidence
which is remote or speculative is a task for the jury with proper instructions.”).
110. 621 N.E.2d 1195 (N.Y. 1993) (reversing Zappavigna v. New York, 588 N.Y.S.2d
585 (App. Div. 1992)).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1196.
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Such factors should be left to the contest between the parties’
market value experts, not magnified and escalated by a whole
new battery of electromagnetic power engineers, scientists or
medical experts.113
The court did state, however, that the plaintiffs must offer evi-
dence of “some prevalent perception of a danger emanating from
the objectionable condition” and establish that this perception
diminishes market value.114
4.   Kansas’s Move to the Majority View: Willsey v. Kansas City
Power & Light Co. and Ryan v. Kansas Power & Light Co.
In 1991, the Kansas Supreme Court, applying the reasoning of
the Kansas Court of Appeals in Willsey v. Kansas City Power &
Light Co.,115 adopted the majority view.116 In Willsey, Kansas City
Power appealed from a judgment in favor of the landowners in an
easement condemnation proceeding.117 Kansas City Power argued
that the trial court had erred in allowing the jury to consider ex-
pert testimony regarding the impact that public fear of power
lines had on the market value of the Willseys’ home.118 In consid-
ering compensation, the court examined the reasonableness of the
                                                                                                             
113. Criscuola, 621 N.E.2d at 1196 (citations omitted).
114. Id. at 1197; see also Richard A. Reed, Fear and Lowering Property Values in New
York: Proof of Consequential Damages from “Cancerphobia” in the Wake of Criscuola v.
Power Authority of the State of New York, 66 N.Y. ST. B.J. 30, 34 (1994) (discussing Cris-
cuola and its impact upon condemnation actions in New York).
115. 631 P.2d 268 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981).
116. Ryan v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 815 P.2d 528, 533 (Kan. 1991).
117. Willsey, 631 P.2d at 270.
118. Id. Kansas City Power specifically objected to the Willseys’ expert witness—a
market analyst, realtor, and appraiser—regarding his answers to questions about the po-
tential for loss to the home’s market value caused by buyer aversion to power lines. Id. at
270-71. The witness testified that:
[P]eople don’t like the unsightliness of it, and then, of course, there is a latent
fear.
. . . .
. . . There is a latent fear on the part of buyers due to this high voltage power
line. This is due in part to some people, it may be imagined, and it may be due
to what they see in the papers, on T.V. and hear on the radio.
. . . .
Q. Mr. Vickers, have you personally seen advertisements in the news media
concerning danger of power lines, and proximity to power lines?
A. Well, the Kansas City Power and Light Company itself is probably the one
who propagates or who informs the public of the danger of getting in contact or
close proximity to power lines.
. . . .
Q. Mr. Vickers, have you in your experience as a real estate broker in talking
to actual buyers in the pit, have those buyers expressed concerns to what you
are relating to right now, to you as a realtor?
A. Absolutely.
Id. at 271.
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public’s fear of power lines and noted that “[a] certain amount of
fear and a healthy wariness in the presence of high voltage lines
strikes us as eminently reasonable.”119 The court concluded that
as long as fear is not unreasonable as a matter of law, reason-
ableness is a question of fact for the jury to decide.120 The court
ultimately held that the property owner’s evidence was
“persuasive” and affirmed the damages award.121
The Willsey court left itself the option to move from the inter-
mediate view to the majority view. While the court in one sen-
tence used the rationale applied by courts that follow the inter-
mediate view,122 in the next sentence the court used the rationale
applied by courts that follow the majority view.123 The court ex-
plained that it preferred the majority view,124 but because the
facts of the case satisfied the intermediate view, the court chose
to remain with that approach.125 The court stated that “the evi-
dence in this case makes it unnecessary for us to choose [between
the intermediate view and the majority view].”126 In fact, several
years later, the Kansas Supreme Court officially chose the majority
view in Ryan v. Kansas Power & Light Co. 127 The Ryan court
stated:
We submit that in effect the Court of Appeals adopted the
[majority rule] in Kansas in Willsey and we agree with its ra-
tionale therein. Accordingly, in a condemnation action to ac-
quire an easement for installation of a high voltage electrical
line we find evidence of fear in the marketplace is admissible
with respect to the value of property taken without proof of the
                                                                                                             
119. Id. at 279.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 279-80.
122. Id. at 277. The court noted that “[r]emote, speculative and conjectural damages
are not to be considered; the owner cannot recover today for an injury to his child which he
fears will happen tomorrow.” Id.
123. Id. at 277-78. The court stated that:
Logic and fairness, however, dictate that any loss of market value proven with
a reasonable degree of probability should be compensable, regardless of its
source. If no one will buy a residential lot because it has a high voltage line
across it, the lot is a total loss even though the owner has the legal right to
build a house on it.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 279.
127. 815 P.2d 528, 533 (Kan. 1991). The Kansas Supreme Court perpetuated the mis-
labeling of the majority view as the minority view, a trend initiated by the Florida Second
District Court of Appeal in Casey v. Florida Power Corp., 157 So. 2d 168, 170-71 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1963). The Kansas Supreme Court, while referring to the minority view throughout
the opinion, intended to state the majority view. Ryan, 815 P.2d at 533-34.
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reasonableness of the fear. . . . [F]ear of a high voltage line is
reasonable.128
5.   Confusion in Virginia: Chappell v. Virginia Electric &
Power Co.
Virginia’s highest court recently issued a decision with omi-
nous overtones for property owners attempting to recover for
diminution in property value caused by public fear. In Chappell v.
Virginia Electric & Power Co. ,129 the Virginia Supreme Court cast
doubt upon the validity of Appalachian Power Co. v. Johnson ,130
the case cited for Virginia’s adoption of the majority view since
1923.131 In affirming the lower court’s denial of damages, the
court stated:
We do not agree that Johnson is controlling precedent. . . .
[T]he language Chappell invokes is obiter dicta. Nevertheless,
we need not decide whether a landowner in a proceeding to
condemn an easement for an electric transmission line may be
entitled to compensation for diminution in the market value of
the remaining land attributable to the fears of prospective pur-
chasers. . . . And, as [the landowner] acknowledged on brief,
“[s]peculative matters should not be considered by commission-
ers in determining just compensation.”132
This language should disturb property owners in Virginia who
face the possibility of litigating a condemnation action. The court
did not need to question Johnson. The landowner merely offered
insubstantial proof that the public’s fear had diminished the
value of the property.133 Proof that the public’s fear causes a
diminution in property value is necessary in jurisdictions adopt-
ing the majority view.134 Therefore, the Chappell court need only
have stated that the plaintiff offered insufficient proof.135 The
court characterized as mere dictum the language from Johnson
cited by the landowner, however, and left open the question of the
                                                                                                             
128. Ryan, 815 P.2d at 533. The court went on to conclude that “evidence of fear in the
marketplace is admissible but no witness, whether expert or non-expert, may use his or
her personal fear as a basis for testifying about fear in the marketplace.” Id. at 533-34.
129. 458 S.E.2d 282 (Va. 1995).
130. 119 S.E. 253 (Va. 1923).
131. Id. at 258 (“[T]he commissioners could have properly taken into consideration the
effect of the fear of the [power] line breaking down and injuring persons and property . . . if
the liability [for] such injury in fact depreciated the market value of the property.”).
132. Chappell, 458 S.E.2d at 284 (citations omitted).
133. Id. The plaintiff “failed to quantify any damage to the fair market value of the
residue attributable to the alleged public fear of high voltage transmission lines.” Id.
134. E.g., Criscuola v. Power Auth. of N.Y., 621 N.E.2d 1195, 1197 (N.Y. 1993).
135. Id.
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proper view regarding compensability for damages caused by fear
of power lines.136 Thus, property owners in a condemnation action
in Virginia should consider offering evidence of the reasonable-
ness of the public’s fear of power lines—as is required of property
owners in jurisdictions following the intermediate view—or face
the possibility of a Virginia appellate court reversing an award
for damages.
III.   STRICT LIABILITY RATIONALES AS JUSTIFICATION FOR THE
MAJORITY VIEW
The majority view is hard to ignore or reason away. Why
should a purely innocent landowner, whose property has depreci-
ated because of the erection of a power line over a portion of his
or her property, have to suffer this loss? Courts following the
majority view rationalize holding power companies liable for di-
minished value caused by fear by stating that the issue in a con-
demnation proceeding is full compensation.137 Additionally, many
courts find it easy to hold against power companies because
power companies often advertise the dangers of power lines, and
thus are at least partially responsible for causing the public’s
fear.138 However, putting aside temporarily the power companies’
part in causing the fear, the argument that power companies
should always pay for a loss caused by fear begs the question:
why should an equally innocent power company, which cannot
necessarily control the general public’s fear, be held responsible
for this loss?139 Strict liability rationales offer the answer to this
question.
                                                                                                             
136. Chappell, 458 S.E.2d at 284. The court actually stated that the issue was
“whether a landowner in a proceeding to condemn an easement for an electric transmis-
sion line may be entitled to compensation for diminution in the market value of the re-
maining land attributable to the fears of prospective purchasers.” Id.
137. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Jennings, 518 So. 2d 895, 897 (Fla. 1987). But see
supra note 85 and accompanying text.
138. E.g., Willsey v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 631 P.2d 268, 279 (Kan. Ct. App.
1981). For example, the Willsey court noted that:
The landowner’s expert testified to the perceived basis for popular fear, and
that was the warning campaigns conducted by electric utilities themselves. . . .
Although not a factor in our decision, it seems highly inconsistent for a com-
pany to warn the public repeatedly of the danger with which an instrumental-
ity is fraught, and then say that public fear of that instrumentality is ground-
less.
Id.
139. Some liken the current EMF scare to medieval witchcraft trials. See Bruce W.
Radford, Lawyers, Witchcraft, and EMF, PUB. UTIL. REP., Sept. 15, 1994, at 6. For exam-
ple, one attorney noted that “[i]n olden days, . . . judges were prone to admit ‘spectral evi-
dence’—testimony about visions, demons, or mysterious events known only to the witness,
and therefore immune to cross-examination.” Id. The attorney continued, observing that
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A.   Strict Liability
The majority view holds that landowners should always be
compensated for loss of market value caused by fears of the gen-
eral public.140 This view holds that power companies, even though
they have arguably done nothing to cause the fear, still must pay
for this loss.141 Courts following the majority view essentially im-
pose liability upon innocent power companies in a manner similar
to how the doctrine of strict liability imposes liability upon inno-
cent actors.142
Strict liability is defined as “liability without fault,”143 with the
analysis focusing on who should bear the loss.144 Strict liability
allows one party to be compensated for a loss caused by another
party, even though the party paying for the loss has done nothing
wrong, morally or otherwise.145 There are several defenses to
strict liability, including assumption of the risk,146 contributory
                                                                                                             
EMF litigation involves claims such as “cancerphobia” and inverse condemnation, which
“rely more on a ‘community-based fear standard’ than scientific analysis: If everyone
shares the belief that EMF is dangerous, it doesn’t matter whether that belief is correct.”
Id. To support this view, the attorney cited Criscuola, 621 N.E.2d at 1195, “in which the
New York Court of Appeals found scientific fact ‘irrelevant’ to the EMF debate, as long as
public perception actually drives down housing prices.” Id.
140. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
141. Id. In contrast, the minority view asks, albeit indirectly, why an actor (here a
power company), through absolutely no fault of its own, should be responsible for a loss
caused by an ignorant public. Minority view courts answer by holding that such a party
should not be liable for that loss. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
142. The majority view is “liability without negligence,” in that an inference of negli-
gence may be refuted by a showing of proper care. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). Even if power com-
panies offer evidence showing that EMF does not cause cancer—thus proving that there is
no lack of proper care on their part and no reasonable basis for the public’s fear—the ma-
jority view still places the loss caused by that fear upon power companies. See supra text
accompanying notes 84-86.
143. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 75, at 534
(5th ed. 1984); see also Spano v. Perini Corp., 250 N.E.2d 31, 33 (N.Y. 1969). Strict liability
“means liability that is imposed on an actor apart from either (1) an intent to interfere
with a legally protected interest without a legal justification for doing so, or (2) a breach of
a duty to exercise reasonable care, i.e., actionable negligence.” KEETON ET AL., supra, § 75,
at 534. The case commonly cited as the seminal decision responsible for advancing notions
of strict liability is Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 H.L. 330 (1868). See Francis H. Bohlen, The Rule
in Rylands v. Fletcher, 59 U. PA. L. REV. 298 (1911). The Restatement (Second) of Torts
later incorporated the Rylands holding. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519, 520
(1964).
144. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 143, § 75, at 536; see also FRANK J. VANDALL,
STRICT LIABILITY: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 46 (1989); Escola, 150 P.2d at 440-41
(Traynor, J., concurring); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal.
1963).
145. KEETON ET AL., supra note 143, § 75, at 536; VANDALL, supra note 144, at 46.
146. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 523 (1964) (“The plaintiff’s assumption of
the risk of harm from an abnormally dangerous activity bars his recovery for the harm.”).
In one suit against a power company, the property owner claimed that he had not been
able to sell his house because nearby power lines scared off potential purchasers. Conn.
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negligence,147 and proximate cause.148 Strict liability is used most
often in tort claims relating to products liability and dangerous
activities.149 The scope of strict liability is expanding, however.150
For example, strict liability has been applied in asbestos litiga-
tion.151 Changing societal values, such as the desire to protect in-
dividuals from personal disaster, are one reason for this expan-
sion.152
Applying strict liability rationales to the majority view does
not require expanding the strict liability doctrine because the
majority view essentially is a strict liability approach. This appli-
cation is useful merely to illustrate the superiority of the majority
view over the intermediate and minority views.
In applying strict liability rationales to the issue of compen-
sability for fear-based market value diminution, one must illus-
trate why a negligence approach would not be preferable.153 It is
important to note that the majority view is not a negligence-
based theory.154
                                                                                                             
Homeowner Sues CL&P Saying EMF Concerns Have Lowered Property Value, UTIL.
ENVTL. REP., Sept. 15, 1995, at 5. However, the power lines were installed years before the
property owner purchased the house. Id. As a possible defense to this claim, the defendant
power company might argue that the plaintiff “assumed the risk” of lost property value
when he moved into the house.
147. “The plaintiff’s contributory negligence in knowingly and unreasonably subjecting
himself to the risk of harm from the activity is a defense to the strict liability.” RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 524(2) (1964).
148. VANDALL, supra note 144, at 56.
149. See generally id. (summarizing law of strict liability).
150. See generally id. at 95-105 (discussing scope of strict liability); see also Virginia E.
Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The Revitalization of Hazardous Activity Strict Liability, 65 N.C.
L. REV. 257, 288 (1987) (“[S]trict liability has expanded beyond manufacturers to include
retailers, wholesalers, and even lessors of products. Since the adoption of strict products
liability . . . various proposals for new areas of strict liability have appeared, and courts
have rendered decisions that suggest such new applications.”). Some argue that strict li-
ability should be extended to professionals such as doctors and lawyers. VANDALL, supra
note 144, at 107.
151. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1081 (5th Cir. 1973);
see also VANDALL, supra note 144, at 98 (noting that “[a]sbestos has been a fertile ground
for the application of strict liability”).
152. Nolan & Ursin, supra note 150, at 289-93 (discussing reasons for expansion of
strict liability).
153. Cf. Richard A. Epstein, Causation—In Context: An Afterword, 63 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 653, 657 (1987) (“One of the most debated topics in the law of tort is surely the choice
of either a negligence or a strict liability rule for accidental harms.”).
154. Starting with the traditional definition of negligence, stated by Prosser and Ke -
ton: “Negligence is a matter of risk . . . of recognizable danger of injury. It has been defined
as ‘conduct which involves an unreasonably great risk of causing damage,’ or, more fully,
conduct ‘which falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others
against unreasonable risk of harm.’ ” KEETON ET AL., supra note 143, § 31, at 169 (citations
omitted); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 282, 291-93 (1964). Negligence oc-
curs when there is a violation of the duty of care. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 143, § 30,
at 164. Strict liability requires no proof of the defendant’s negligence. See 1 STUART M.
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 The majority view imposes liability upon power companies
once the landowner shows that the public’s fear of power lines
has caused a diminution in property value; there is no determi-
nation of a duty of care as there is with a negligence approach.155
Additionally, unlike a negligence approach, the majority view does
not require balancing the parties’ interests.156 The property owner
simply must demonstrate that the public’s fear has caused a dimi-
nution in property value.157 The majority view court then strictly
imposes liability upon the power company, which must compensate
the landowner for the diminution.158 Therefore, because the major-
ity requires no proof of care or balancing of interests, the majority
view cannot properly be called a negligence approach.
The principal rationales for strict liability are discussed in the
following sections and illustrate why the majority view is supe-
rior to the minority and intermediate views.159
B.   Corrective Justice
Several commentators support strict liability with notions of
corrective justice.160 Corrective justice focuses on determining
what is fair between the victim and defendant, rather than
broader concerns about society as a whole.161
1.   Causation
One corrective justice model centers upon fairness and sug-
gests that the primary issue should be causation: whether A
caused harm to B.162 Under this model, the objective should be to
                                                                                                             
SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 18:30 (1983). Indeed, the doctrine of strict
liability applies even if the defendant “has exercised all possible care.” RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2) (1964).
155. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Jennings, 518 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 1987) (failing to
make duty of care determination).
156. Negligence requires that a balancing test be applied, usually through the use of a
risk-benefit form of analysis. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 143, at 173 (citations omitted);
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 282, 291-93 (1964).
157. E.g., Criscuola v. Power Auth. of N.Y., 621 N.E.2d 1195, 1197 (N.Y. 1993).
158. Id.
159. Law and economics (economic analysis) and corrective justice are the two most
powerful legal theories today, and both offer support for strict liability. Christopher H.
Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA L. REV. 439, 439
(1990). This Comment justifies the majority view by concentrating analysis on these theo-
ries. See discussion infra part III.B-C.
160. See generally 1 SPEISER ET AL., supra note 154, § 1:37.
161. G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 224 (1980).
For a summary of corrective justice theories, see Susan Randall, Corrective Justice and the
Torts Process, 27 IND. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1993).
162. Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 152, 166
(1973).
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take “into account common sense notions of individual responsi-
bility.”163 Individuals should be free from harm to either their
personal bodily integrity or their property.164 If a victim can show
that a defendant’s actions caused harm to the victim’s bodily in-
tegrity or property, the victim should be able to recover, and any
defenses the defendant might have should be narrowly applied.165
After causation is established, a defendant can assert justifica-
tions or defenses, such as lack of causation or assumption of the
risk.166 The philosophy behind this theory and the reason causa-
tion is its focus is that allowing courts to decide cases involving
individuals while considering society’s needs at the same time
delegates too much power to the judiciary to impose restrictions
upon individual liberty.167 Moreover, because individuals have a
right not to be harmed, conduct causing harm cannot be justified
by focusing on society’s needs.168 Therefore, the fairest standard is
strict liability.169
When a power company erects a power line adjacent to an in-
dividual’s property, and the public’s fear of that power line causes
an additional diminution in value to the land, the erection of the
power line has harmed the landowner.170 Before there will be li-
ability, however, there must be damage, either to person or to
property.171 Under the corrective justice model, a prima facie case
of liability is established if the landowner can show a causal link
between the erection of the power line and the diminution in
property value caused by the public’s fear of the power line.172
The minority view does not permit recovery even in the face of
evidence that the fear caused a diminution in market value.173
The minority view appears to consider society’s needs,174 which is
                                                                                                             
163. Id. at 151.
164. Id. at 164; see also Richard A. Epstein, Intentional Harms, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 391,
441 (1975).
165. Epstein, supra note 162, at 166, 204.
166. Id. at 204; Richard A. Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System of
Strict Liability, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 165, 169, 170, 207-11 (1974).
167. WHITE, supra note 161, at 228.
168. 1 SPEISER ET AL., supra note 154, § 1:37, at 135.
169. Id.
170. See Epstein, supra note 162, at 166.
171. Id. The intermediate and majority views require a showing that the fear caused
actual diminution in value to the property. See supra text accompanying notes 57, 84. As
noted by Professor Richard Epstein, “the minimum condition of . . . liability is damage to
the person or property of the plaintiff.” Epstein, supra note 162, at 166.
172. See Epstein, supra note 162, at 168.
173. See Alabama Power Co. v. Keystone Lime Co., 67 So. 833, 835 (Ala. 1914).
174. Cf. Pappas v. Alabama Power Co., 119 So. 2d 899, 905 (Ala. 1960) (holding that
the minority view “is sound and probably even more necessary in this modern age of sci-
entific and industrial expansion.”).
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inappropriate in a corrective justice regime.175 Thus, the minority
view is inadequate because it imposes liability upon the harmed
landowner.176 The intermediate view also is flawed because it re-
quires a showing of reasonableness,177 when the main inquiry un-
der the corrective justice model requires a showing of causa-
tion.178 Because the requisite causation is present, liability should
be imposed regardless of the reasonableness of the public’s fear.179
The most forceful approach under a corrective justice regime is
the majority view. The requisite causation is present: the erection
of power lines caused a diminution in property value by creating
a fear of contracting cancer in the buying public.180 Thus, it is fair
to impose this loss upon power companies rather than property
owners.181 The corrective justice model concludes that “the prin-
ciples of strict liability say that the liberty of one person ends
when he causes harm to another.”182
2.   Reciprocity and Reasonableness
Another theory advances notions of corrective justice and fair-
ness, but notes that there are two paradigms, or models, of liabil-
ity: the paradigm of reciprocity and the paradigm of reasonable-
ness.183 The basic premise of the paradigm of reciprocity is that,
in determining liability, a court should examine the conduct of
both the defendant and victim.184 If the defendant and victim ex-
pose each other to an equal amount of risk, strict liability should
not apply.185 For example, “two airplanes flying in the same vicin-
ity subject each other to reciprocal risks of a mid-air collision,”
and therefore strict liability should be precluded.186 On the other
hand, if the defendant’s actions expose the victim to a unilateral,
nonreciprocal risk, strict liability should apply.187 For example, “a
pilot or an airplane owner subjects those beneath the path of
                                                                                                             
175. 1 SPEISER ET AL., supra note 154, § 1:37, at 135.
176. See Epstein, supra note 162, at 168.
177. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
178. Epstein, supra note 162, at 165-66, 204.
179. See id.
180. See id. at 166.
181. See id. at 151. “The task is to develop a normative theory of torts that takes into
account common sense notions of individual responsibility.” Id.
182. Id. at 203-04.
183. George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 540
(1972).
184. 1 SPEISER ET AL., supra note 154, § 1:37, at 131.
185. Fletcher, supra note 183, at 542.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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flight to nonreciprocal risks of harm,” and strict liability should
apply.188 If the victim’s injury results from a nonreciprocal risk of
harm, the defendant is not always under a duty to pay.189 Nonre-
ciprocal risk-creation may be excused when it is unfair to require
the defendant to pay.190
Power lines fall into “the set of cases in which a socially useful
activity imposes nonreciprocal risks on those around it.”191 When
the presence of power lines causes a diminution in property
value, however, a nonreciprocal risk is imposed upon an innocent
landowner. Through no fault of the landowner, the property’s
value decreases. Thus, the paradigm of reciprocity permits recov-
ery for the landowner and supports the majority view.
One must point out, however, the second model of liability—
the paradigm of reasonableness. The paradigm of reasonableness
suggests that instead of focusing solely on the defendant and the
victim, the issue of liability must be decided by considering the
impact the decision will have upon society at large.192 This para-
digm determines who will bear the loss by focusing on the rea-
sonableness of the risk:
Reasonableness is determined by a straightforward balancing
of costs and benefits. If the risk yields a net social utility
(benefit), the victim is not entitled to recover from the risk-
creator; if the risk yields a net social disutility (cost), the victim
is entitled to recover. The premises of this paradigm are that
reasonableness provides a test of activities that ought to be en-
couraged and that tort judgments are an appropriate medium
for encouraging them.193
One can argue that society suffers by allowing property owners
to recover the loss in market value caused by the public’s fear.
                                                                                                             
188. Id.
189. Id. at 551.
190. Id. at 541, 551-556. For example, conduct may be excused in the case of unavoid-
able ignorance. Id. at 551-56. Professor Fletcher notes that the “issue of fairness is ex-
pressed by asking whether the defendant’s creating the relevant risk was excused on the
ground . . . that the defendant could not have known of the risk latent in his conduct.” Id.
at 541. Power companies must recognize that the erection of power lines will result in an
additional diminution in property value because of the public’s fear of adverse health ef-
fects. Cf. Iowa Power & Light Co. v. Stortenbecker, 334 N.W.2d 326, 331 (Iowa Ct. App.
1983) (power company conceded that testimony offered to show effect fear of adverse
health consequences from power lines might have upon property value could be relevant in
that regard). Thus, this excuse should not be available to power companies.
191. Fletcher, supra note 183, at 569.
192. Id. at 556.
193. Id. at 542-43. The paradigm of reasonableness represents economic efficiency
analysis, see discussion infra part III.C, as opposed to the paradigm of reciprocity, which
represents corrective justice. Joseph M. Steiner, Economics, Morality, and the Law of
Torts, 26 U. TORONTO L.J. 227, 247 (1976).
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Appealing to the paradigm of reasonableness, one could assert
that the activity is socially advantageous and warrants encour-
agement. The dilemma is whether to focus on the parties and
their relationship or on society and its needs.194 Courts following
the minority view employ the latter dynamic, which favors the
power company, perhaps because they fear that finding in favor
of property owners will ultimately impede progress and, there-
fore, hurt society.195
At least as the issue relates to power companies, however, cor-
rective justice requires that courts protect individual interests.
Indeed, corrective justice advocates the paradigm of reciprocity
and rejects the paradigm of reasonableness as a model for liabil-
ity.196 And under the paradigm of reciprocity, “ ‘justice’ . . . should
be equated with justice between the parties, not with broader
conceptions of the welfare of the community.”197 Individual inter-
ests should be insulated against “community demands.”198 Thus,
according to the paradigm of reciprocity, the majority view is su-
perior.199
                                                                                                             
194. Fletcher, supra note 183, at 569.
195. See supra text accompanying note 43; cf. Pappas v. Alabama Power Co., 119 So.
2d 899, 905 (Ala. 1960). For example, the Pappas decision, in reaffirming Keystone Lime,
implied that if the court permitted recovery of damages, the public would eventually suffer
because it would be too costly to support projects for the public good. Id.
196. WHITE, supra note 161, at 224; Fletcher, supra note 183, at 550-51.
197. WHITE, supra note 161, at 224; see also Fletcher, supra note 183, at 550.
198. Fletcher, supra note 183, at 569. “The burden should fall on the wealth-shifting
mechanism of the tort system to insulate individual interests against community de-
mands. By providing compensation for injuries exacted in the public interest, the tort sys-
tem can protect individual autonomy by taxing, but not prohibiting, socially useful activi-
ties.” Id.
199. But see discussion infra part IV (discussing situations in which societal interests
may take precedence over interests of the individual). For criticisms of the causation and
reciprocity corrective justice models, see Richard A. Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2
J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 215-221 (1973); Steiner, supra note 193, at 243-50; WHITE, supra note
161, at 224-30.
Jules Coleman advances another model centering on notions of corrective justice. See
JULES COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 329 (1992). This model is quite different from his
earlier writing on the subject. Interestingly, Coleman explicitly rejects his earlier views
on corrective justice. See Jules L. Coleman, Risks and Wrongs, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 637, 644-45 (1992). The model has two components: wrongfulness and responsibil-
ity. See COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra, at 329. Corrective justice requires that an
actor repair the wrongful losses for which he or she is responsible. Id. at 345. Indeed,
corrective justice governs a loss only if the loss is wrongful. Id. at 361. An actor must
repair wrongful losses that result from either wrongdoing (unjustified actions) or a
wrong (an invasion of rights). Id. at 332, 361. The second category covers cases of strict
liability.
In applying this model to strict liability, Coleman notes that:
Sometimes innocent or justifiable conduct can be contrary to the constraints
imposed by the rights of others. If it is, justifiable or innocent conduct can con-
stitute a wrong, and when it does, the losses that result are wrongful in the
sense necessary to impose on the injurer a duty to repair.
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C.   Economic Efficiency
Economic efficiency is the notion that rules of law should pro-
mote efficient resource allocation.200 Strict liability is one means
of attaining efficient resource allocation.201 Theories of economic
efficiency that support strict liability also support the majority
view; most notable among these theories are the reduction of
transaction costs, the cheapest cost avoider rationale, and the en-
terprise model.202
1.   Reduction of Transaction Costs
A liability rule is economically efficient if it reduces transac-
tion costs.203 Transaction costs include the cost of litigation.204 In-
deed, a liability rule that simplifies the proof necessary to estab-
lish liability is preferable to a rule that imposes more of a burden
upon litigants.205
Under this view, strict liability is efficient because it reduces
the costs of litigation, and by analogy, the majority view is effi-
cient.206 Unlike the intermediate view, the majority view does not
require litigation of the reasonableness of the public’s fear; this
                                                                                                             
Id. at 371. Thus, by installing power lines, power companies have invaded the rights of
property owners. Id. at 361. The installation of power lines has resulted in a loss to the
property owner because of the additional diminution in property value caused by the pub-
lic’s fear. Id. Even though power companies are “innocent,” in that they arguably have no
control over the public’s fear, they must still repair, or compensate, landowners for dimi-
nution caused by fear. Id. at 371.
200. Steiner, supra note 193, at 227-28.
201. E.g., Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in
Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060-64, 1084 (1972). But see Posner, supra note 199, at 221
(arguing that strict liability is not as efficient as negligence).
202. Cf. Richman v. Charter Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp. 192, 203-04 (E.D. La. 1983) (finding
that “economic efficiency” requires strict liability), modified, 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985).
203. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1096-97 (1972).
204. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 225-26 (1970). As noted by one
commentator:
[An] efficiency objective traditionally considered relevant in determining liabil-
ity standards is the reduction of transaction costs, which include the costs of
operating the accident reparation system. Holding other factors constant, li-
ability standards that reduce these costs, by simplifying the proof necessary to
establish liability, for example, are preferable to standards that are more costly
to administer.
James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Reliance on Public Policy: An Empirical Analysis of
Products Liability Decisions, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1570, 1579 (1991).
205. See Henderson, supra note 204, at 1579. 
206. See CALABRESI, supra note 204, at 225-26; Henderson, supra note 204, at 1579.
See also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §§ 6.5, 21.6 (1992) (debating
whether strict liability is more efficient than negligence). The minority view achieves the
same result, but, for other reasons, the majority view on balance is superior. See discus-
sion infra part V (summarizing majority view’s superiority).
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simplifies “the proof necessary to establish liability.”207 The ma-
jority view also leads to certainty because litigators know the
diminution caused by the public’s fear is compensable.208 Thus,
the court’s time and the client’s money need not be wasted on a
barrage of expert testimony about possible adverse health ef-
fects.209
In contrast, the intermediate view leads to economic ineffi-
ciency because courts must litigate the reasonableness of the
public’s fear.210 Courts therefore end up hearing additional expert
testimony as to whether, for example, power lines cause cancer.211
Moreover, in many cases (but not all), the intermediate view
leads to the same result as the majority view, with the majority
view avoiding needless costs.212 Indeed, many courts have held
that the public’s fear is reasonable and have therefore permitted
a damages award.213 Thus, from an efficiency standpoint, the in-
termediate view needlessly wastes resources by forcing parties to
litigate the reasonableness of the public’s fear.
2.   Cost Avoidance
The “cheapest cost avoider” rationale suggests that if actors
are held strictly liable, they will attempt to avoid suits by exercis-
ing a higher degree of care.214 Under this rationale, losses should
                                                                                                             
207. See Henderson, supra note 204, at 1579.
208. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Jennings, 518 So. 2d 895, 899 (Fla. 1987) (“[Under the
majority rule,] the reasonableness of fear is either assumed or is considered irrelevant.”). Con-
versely, if a jurisdiction follows the minority view, litigators know that the diminution is not
compensable. See Alabama Power Co. v. Keystone Lime Co., 67 So. 833, 835 (Ala. 1914).
209. See Henderson, supra note 204, at 1579.
210. See Heddin v. Delhi Gas Pipeline Co., 522 S.W.2d 886, 888-89 (Tex. 1975) (“To es-
tablish that there is a basis in reason or experience for the fear, it is incumbent upon the
landowners to show either an [a]ctual danger forming the basis of such fear or that the
fear is reasonable . . . .”); see also supra note 204 and accompanying text.
211. Jennings, 518 So. 2d at 899 (“The experts’ scientific testimony introduced below
was irrelevant to any fact at issue. . . . Instead, the scientific testimony altered the focus of
the trial and confused the issue to be determined.”); see also Criscuola v. Power Auth. of
N.Y., 621 N.E.2d 1195, 1196 (N.Y. 1993) (“[Valuation] factors should be left to the contest
between the parties’ market value experts, not magnified and escalated by a whole new
battery of electromagnetic power engineers, scientists or medical experts.”).
212. See, e.g., John Weiss, Note, The Power Line Controversy: Legal Responses to Potential
Electromagnetic Field Health Hazards, 15 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 359, 373 (1990) (“This review of
case law standards regarding power line electromagnetic fields has shown that most jurisdic-
tions (courts following both the majority and intermediate standards) allow the public’s fear of
power line electromagnetic fields to be considered in awarding compensation.”).
213. See, e.g., Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Haskins, 528 S.W.2d 407 (Ark. 1975);
Northeastern Gas Transmission Co. v. Tersana Acres, Inc., 134 A.2d 253, 256 (Conn.
1957); Colvard v. Natahala Power & Light Co., 167 S.E. 472 (N.C. 1933); Delhi Gas Pipe-
line Co. v. Reid, 488 S.W.2d 612, 614 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972).
214. See CALABRESI, supra note 204, at 26; Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno,
150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); Halphen v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110, 118 (La. 1986).
152 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:125
be allocated to those who can most inexpensively reduce the risk
of “accidents,” or, for our purposes, reduce the risk of diminution
of property value.215
Under the cheapest cost avoider rationale, the minority view
imposes the cost of avoiding diminution in market value upon the
landowner,216 a party not suited to manage the risks and percep-
tions associated with EMF.217 Therefore, the minority view is in-
appropriate. The intermediate view is less objectionable because
the landowner may recover once fear is established as reason-
able.218 If, however, the fear is unreasonable, the loss is again im-
posed upon the ill-suited landowner.219 Therefore, the intermedi-
ate view is similarly inappropriate.
The majority view is superior because power companies are
the cheapest cost avoiders. Power companies have more capital to
invest in eliminating the risks associated with EMF, including
continued scientific exploration of the relationship, if any, be-
tween EMF and cancer.220 Research indicating EMF does not
cause cancer can alleviate the general public’s fear of power lines,
and thus could eliminate the diminution in property value caused
by that fear. Moreover, power companies can practice “prudent
avoidance,” the practice of minimizing the effects of EMF by
taking reasonable steps to reduce the public’s exposure to EMF.221
Indeed, several jurisdictions already have adopted the policy of
prudent avoidance.222 Therefore, because power companies are the
cheapest cost avoiders, the majority view is superior.
                                                                                                             
215. See Escola, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring).
216. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
217. See CALABRESI, supra note 204, at 26.
218. See supra notes 57 and accompanying text.
219. See CALABRESI, supra note 204, at 26.
220. Id.; see also Lisa Bogardus, Recovery and Allocation of Electromagnetic Field
Mitigation Costs in Electric Utility Rates, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1705, 1705-06 (1994)
(“[E]lectric utilities are spending significant sums of money on research, education pro-
grams, design changes, and litigation fees.”).
221. See QUESTIONS ABOUT EMF, supra note 1, at 51-52; Bogardus, supra note 220, at
1711-17; Harunuzzaman & Iyyuni, supra note 7, at 188-94 (summarizing state legislative
action to EMF health effects issues). But see Edward Gerjuoy, Electromagnetic Fields:
Physics, Biology and Law, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 55, 73-75 (1994) (arguing against policy of
prudent avoidance).
222. Bogardus, supra note 220, at 1711-17; Harunuzzaman & Iyyuni, supra note 7, at 188-94.
1996]                    POWER LINE DILEMMA 153
3.   The Enterprise Model
a.   Loss Shifting
Under the so-called “enterprise model,”223 strict liability is an
appropriate response because the actor who caused the loss
should bear the loss.224 The rationale is that the seller is in a bet-
ter position to absorb the damages than the consumer.225 Thus,
the loss is shifted to the manufacturer, who can then spread the
loss among all consumers of the product by raising the price.226 A
commonly cited example of a judge applying this justification is
Justice Traynor’s concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bo t-
tling Co. of Fresno .227 Justice Traynor noted that loss shifting fo-
cuses on public policy: “[t]he cost of an injury and the loss of time
or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person in-
jured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by
                                                                                                             
223. See generally 1 SPEISER ET AL., supra note 154, § 1:30 (summarizing enterprise model).
224. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (Cal. 1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring); see also FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS 195, 195-
96 (2d ed. 1986); Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of
Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 500-01 (1961).
225. Wright v. Newman, 735 F.2d 1073, 1077 (8th Cir. 1984); Halphen v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110, 118-19 (La. 1986); Calabresi, supra note 224, at 500-
01; see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 143, § 75, at 537:
The courts have tended to lay stress upon the fact that the defendant is act-
ing for his own purposes, and is seeking a benefit or a profit from such activi-
ties, and that he is in a better position to administer the unusual risk by pas -
ing it on to the public than is the innocent victim. The problem is dealt with as
one of allocating a more or less inevitable loss to be charged against a complex
and dangerous civilization, and liability is imposed upon the party best able to
shoulder it.
226. Wright, 735 F.2d at 1077; Becker v. IRM Corp., 698 P.2d 116, 123 (Cal. 1985);
Halphen, 484 So. 2d at 118-19; Calabresi, supra note 224, at 500-01. But see RICHARD A.
POSNER, TORT LAW (CASES AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS) 517-18 (1982) (challenging loss shift-
ing as an adequate rationale for strict liability). A similar concept is the “deep pockets” ra-
tionale, which holds that “losses can be reduced most by placing them on the categories of
people least likely to suffer substantial social or economic dislocations as a result of bear-
ing them, usually thought to be the wealthy.” CALABRESI, supra note 204, at 40. Power
companies would be likely candidates for liability under a deep pockets rationale as well
because power companies are generally wealthier than individual property owners.
227. 150 P.2d 436, 440-46 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J. concurring). In Escola, a waitress in
a restaurant was injured when a Coca Cola bottle exploded in her hand. Id. at 437-38. The
majority upheld an award of damages based upon res ipsa loquitur, holding that “the thing
speaks for itself”: only a defective Coca Cola bottle will explode. Id. at 440. Concurring,
Justice Traynor agreed with the result, but opined that a theory of strict liability was more
appropriate:
I believe the manufacturer’s negligence should no longer be singled out as the
basis of a plaintiff’s right to recover in cases like the present one. In my opinion
it should now be recognized that a manufacturer incurs an absolute liability
when an article that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used
without inspection, proves to have a defect that causes injury to human beings.
Id. (Traynor, J., concurring); see also ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND
ECONOMICS 431-33 (1988) (discussing Justice Traynor’s concurrence in Escola).
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the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of
doing business.”228 In adopting Justice Traynor’s loss shifting ra-
tionale in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc. ,229 the California
Supreme Court noted that “[t]he purpose [of strict liability] is to
insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products
are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the
market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to
protect themselves.”230
b.   Internalization of Costs
Loss shifting essentially requires that profit-motivated actors
pay for all losses their activities generate.231 Losses that the actor
should bear include “externalities.”232 An externality is a
“spillover effect” from an activity that is not considered by the ac-
tor at the time the actor decides the manner in which the activity
will be accomplished.233 The most common example of an exter-
nality is pollution.234 Suppose a factory emits smoke that damages
a neighboring farm’s crops. This damage is an externality in that
it is external to the factory’s operation.235 Stated another way, the
damage caused by the smoke falls upon someone other than the
factory.
Regardless of the social value of an actor’s activity, the actor
should internalize the loss if the activity exposes others to the
loss.236 The actor can internalize losses by raising the cost of the
service or product, thus spreading the loss among consumers.237
Externalities are inefficient; therefore, by requiring actors to in-
ternalize losses, society benefits.238
                                                                                                             
228. Escola, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring).
229. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
230. Id. at 901; see also HARPER ET AL., supra note 224, at 195.
231. See A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 98-99 (1983); see also
Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980); Wright v.
Newman, 735 F.2d 1073, 1077 (8th Cir. 1984); Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., 567 P.2d 218,
222 (Wash. 1977); Atlas Chemical Indus., Inc. v. Anderson, 514 S.W.2d 309, 315-16 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1974), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 524 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 1975).
232. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 227, at 169.
233. Steiner, supra note 193, at 229; see also COOTER & ULEN, supra note 227, at 169
(defining externalities as “a cost or benefit that the voluntary actions of one or more people
impose or confer on a third party or parties without their consent”). The concept of exter-
nalities is discussed at length in Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57
AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967).
234. See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 227, at 170.
235. See id.
236. See Calabresi, supra note 224, at 500-01.
237. See id.
238. “Efficiency can be restored by getting the externality-generator to internalize
these external effects.” COOTER & ULEN, supra note 227, at 170.
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c.   Application of the Enterprise Model
Applying the principles of the enterprise model (loss shifting
and internalization of costs) to the three principal views address-
ing compensability for diminution in market value caused by the
public’s fear, the majority view emerges as superior. First, the
minority view is contrary to the rationales behind the enterprise
model. The minority view imposes the loss in all cases upon the
injured person,239 who is unable to spread the risk.240 Moreover,
the minority view perpetuates an externality: it allows power
companies to expose landowners to a loss (the diminution in
market value caused by the public’s fear) yet does not require
power companies to compensate landowners for the loss.241 The
minority view denies compensation to landowners even if the
public’s fear causes a reduction in market value.242 Allowing
power companies to escape liability for this loss allows them to
externalize the loss.243
The intermediate view fails to incorporate fully the enterprise
model because the view does not always impose the loss upon the
responsible actor.244 The intermediate view, however, is a move
toward the enterprise model. Once a landowner establishes the
reasonableness of the fear, the court imposes liability upon the
power company, not the individual.245 The intermediate view
merely imposes an additional burden upon the landowner, the
burden of proving the reasonableness of the fear.246
Of the three views, the majority view most adequately ad-
vances the goals of the enterprise model. The majority view holds
that if the landowner establishes that the public’s fear has de-
pressed the market value of the land, then the loss is imposed
upon the power company in all cases.247 This is the best and most
fair result because power companies are better equipped to bear
the loss than innocent property owners.248 Also, because most
                                                                                                             
239. Alabama Power Co. v. Keystone Lime Co., 67 So. 833, 835 (Ala. 1914).
240. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963); Halphen v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110, 118-19 (La. 1986).
241. See, e.g., Keystone Lime, 67 So. at 837.
242. Id. at 835.
243. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 227, at 170.
244. See Calabresi, supra note 224, at 500-01.
245. Willsey v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 631 P.2d 268, 279 (Kan. Ct. App.
1981).
246. Id. at 279.
247. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Jennings, 518 So. 2d 895, 899 (Fla. 1987).
248. See Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110, 118-19 (La. 1986).
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power companies are motivated by profit,249 they should pay for
all losses their activities generate.250 The majority view incorpo-
rates this philosophy and rightly imposes the risk of market de-
valuation upon power companies, who, like manufacturers, can
distribute the loss among the public as a business cost.251
Indeed, courts following the intermediate and majority views
have used loss shifting rationales in holding for landowners. For
example, the Willsey court opined that “[i]f [loss caused by the
public’s fear] is proven to the satisfaction of the jury we see no
reason why the landowner should bear the loss rather than the
customers for whose benefit the loss is inflicted.”252 Courts follow-
ing the majority view also have used loss shifting rationales.253
Importantly, society experiences a net gain when power com-
panies are required to internalize the problems associated with
EMF because power companies will continue to research the ef-
fects of EMF, educate the public about EMF, and practice pru-
dent avoidance.254 If power companies are not held responsible for
this loss, it is less likely that they will continue to engage in such
beneficial activities.
IV.   BALANCING INTERESTS
One must distinguish, however, power companies from actors
who are either unable to avoid costs, spread the loss, or who pro-
vide significant societal benefits when measured against the
landowner’s interests, and who thus should not be required to
compensate a private landowner. For example, it may be inap-
propriate to require compensation where homeless shelters,
homes for maladjusted teens, or AIDS hospices have caused a
                                                                                                             
249. Power companies are regulated by the government, but profit does play a part in
the decisionmaking process. Bogardus, supra note 220, at 1738-39.
250. See VANDALL, supra note 144, at 21; Bogardus, supra note 220, at 1721-24
(discussing processes involving ratemaking and assurances of reasonable profit).
251. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring); Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110, 118-
19 (La. 1986). In fact, power companies frequently reflect the costs of litigating EMF
claims, including tort damage awards, in utility rates, thus illustrating loss shifting in
action. See Bogardus, supra note 220, at 1725; see also In re Public Serv. Co. of Ind.,
Inc., 112 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 94, 124 (Ind. Util. Regulatory Comm’n 1990); In re
South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 37 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 441, 463 (S.C. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n 1980).
252. Willsey v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 631 P.2d 268, 278 (Kan. Ct. App.
1981). For a discussion of Kansas’s move to the majority view, see supra part II.C.4.
253. E.g., San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Daley, 253 Cal. Rptr. 144, 151 (Ct. App. 1988)
(citing Willsey, 631 P.2d at 278).
254. Cf. Bogardus, supra note 220, at 1705-06 (noting the significant amount of money
power companies are spending on research and education).
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diminution in an individual’s property value. The intermediate
view would probably hold that fear of these activities is unrea-
sonable, and thus noncompensable.255 The minority view would
not allow recovery even if the fear were reasonable.256
There is the possibility, however, that even in majority view
jurisdictions, courts could make a policy judgment and hold
against the landowner. As an analogy, in Davis v. Dinkins ,257
homeowners near a privately owned hotel sought to enjoin the
hotel from being used as a shelter for homeless families.258 The
homeowners claimed that the presence of the shelter had caused
a diminution in their property values.259 The court declined to is-
sue the injunction on public policy grounds, noting that “the
granting of such relief is inappropriate under the circumstances
now existing in New York City. The indisputable compelling need
to provide temporary housing for homeless families clearly makes
it an abuse of discretion to preclude the use of a hotel which is al-
ready housing these families.”260 It is apparent that even if the
homeowners could have demonstrated that the shelter had
caused a diminution in property value, the court still would have
denied the injunction because of the important societal interest in
providing shelter for the homeless.261 Another court, facing the
same issue, reached a similar conclusion, noting that “a balancing
of the equities lies decidedly in favor of defendants’ continued op-
eration of this homeless shelter.”262
If court-made policy is objectionable, the legislature could
make a policy judgment that the doctrine of strict liability is in-
appropriate in a specific instance. The legislature might decide
that a particular societal need outweighs the interests of an in-
dividual. For example, there may come a time when a property
owner attempts to recover for a diminution in property value
                                                                                                             
255. See discussion supra part II.B.
256. See discussion supra part II.A.
257. 585 N.Y.S.2d 978 (Sup. Ct. 1992), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 613 N.Y.S.2d 933
(App. Div. 1994).
258. Id. at 981.
259. Id. at 982.
260. Id.
261. Id.; see also Sunderland Family Treatment Serv. v. City of Pasco, 903 P.2d 986,
993 (Wash. 1995) (en banc) (holding that denial of special use permit for group home crisis
center on grounds that fear of home’s clientele reduced area property values “would be
based on unsubstantiated fears” and “is not competent nor substantial evidence”).
262. Greentree at Murray Hill Condominium v. Good Shepherd Episcopal Church, 550
N.Y.S.2d 981, 989 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989). But see Steadham v. Board of Zoning Adjustment,
629 So. 2d 647 (Ala. 1993) (finding a challenge to a zoning variance permitting the facility
for juvenile offenders permissible because there was evidence that the proposed use could
result in diminished property value).
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when an entity attempts to establish a home for AIDS victims in
a residential neighborhood. A property owner might argue that
his or her land has been devalued because some potential pur-
chasers might be afraid of contracting this deadly disease.263
Legislatures may decide that in such situations a property owner
will not be permitted to recover for this loss, even if a governmen-
tal agency is in charge of the home.264 The legislature might rea-
son that allowing a damages award in this situation would have
the adverse effect of eliminating a great social value, especially if
the service did not have either the resources to litigate the claim
or the ability to spread the loss. Thus, in this situation, the bal-
ance may tip in favor of the AIDS hospice.265
Indeed, legislatures have acted to prevent imposition of strict
liability when the balance has favored protection of a certain ac-
tivity. For example, in an effort to promote the health and wel-
fare of the community by protecting the societal value hospitals
and blood banks provide, legislatures in most states have decided
to shield those institutions from strict liability claims by plain-
tiffs who contract AIDS from blood transfusions.266 The legisla-
                                                                                                             
263. Cf. Association of Relatives & Friends of AIDS Patients (A.F.A.P.S.) v. Regula-
tions & Permits Admin. or Administracion de Reglamentos y Permisos (A.R.P.E.), 740 F.
Supp. 95, 99 (D.P.R. 1990) (defendant opposed group’s efforts to establish AIDS hospice in
part because of fear the hospice might devalue surrounding property); Poff v. Caro, 549
A.2d 900, 902 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) (landlord violated anti-discrimination laws
by refusing to rent to homosexuals; landlord “feared that they might later acquire AIDS
and thereby endanger his family”).
264. A court could make this judgment as well. For example, in Adkins v. Thomas Sol-
vent Co., 487 N.W.2d 715 (Mich. 1992), the Michigan Supreme Court stated:
In short, we do not agree with the dissent’s suggestion that wholly unfounded
fears of third parties regarding the conduct of a lawful business satisfy the re-
quirement for a legally cognizable injury as long as property values decline. In-
deed, we would think it not only “odd,” but anachronistic that a claim of nui-
sance in fact could be based on unfounded fears regarding persons with AIDS
moving into a neighborhood, the establishment of otherwise lawful group
homes for the disabled, or unrelated persons living together, merely because
the fears experienced by third parties would cause a decline in property values.
Id. at 726 (citations omitted).
265. If there is no legislative action, a court also might hold that, on balance, it would
not be appropriate to require the hospice to pay for this loss. See Good Shepherd Episcopal
Church, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 989.
266. See Roberts v. Suburban Hosp. Ass’n, Inc., 532 A.2d 1081, 1086 n.3 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1987) (listing 48 jurisdictions with statutes excluding strict liability as basis for
holding blood banks and hospitals liable in suits by plaintiffs who contract AIDS from
blood transfusions). At the time of the Roberts opinion, only New Jersey, the District of
Columbia, and Vermont did not have a blood shield statute. Id. New Jersey and District of
Columbia courts previously had concluded that blood banks were immune from strict li-
ability. See Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 317 A.2d 392, 398 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974),
aff’d, 332 A.2d 596 (N.J. 1975); Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 663 F. Supp. 1048, 1060-1061
(D.D.C. 1987), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 851 F.2d 437 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Moreover,
Vermont has since adopted a blood shield statute. VT. STAT. tit. 9A, § 2-108 (1995). See
also Michael J. Miller, Strict Liability, Negligence and the Standard of Care for Transfu-
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tures apparently fear requiring “providers to serve as insurers of
the safety of these materials [because such a requirement] might
impose such an overwhelming burden as to discourage the gath-
ering and distribution of blood.”267
Therefore, while the majority view, supported by strict liability
rationales, encourages imposition of losses caused by the public’s
fear upon the actor most responsible for the fear, it does not pre-
clude courts or legislatures from recognizing that the balance
may tip against the landowner where overriding societal interests
are at stake.268
V.   CONCLUSION
EMF litigation involving market devaluation of property
caused by the public’s fear is an area of the law fraught with un-
certainty. It is unlikely that a single approach will be adopted by
every jurisdiction. However, the recent defection of New York and
Kansas to the majority view, New Mexico’s adoption of the major-
ity view in 1992, and the propensity of jurisdictions to reverse
years of precedent by switching to the majority view (as did
Florida) may indicate that significant change is on the horizon.269
A strict liability approach to compensability for diminished
property value caused by the public’s fear is preferable to other
approaches, such as a negligence-based approach. At its core, the
majority view is essentially strict liability. The rationales for
strict liability support movement to the majority view and rejec-
tion of the intermediate and minority views. Corrective justice
requires that the interests of the landowner take precedent.
Moreover, not only does the majority view reduce transaction
costs, power companies also are the cheapest cost avoider because
they have more resources to reduce the risks of EMF. Finally,
power companies are better able to internalize costs, including
the recovery of EMF litigation costs, by spreading the loss among
                                                                                                             
sion-Transmitted Disease, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 473, 490 (1994) (“These states did not want to
inhibit the exercise of sound medical judgment and restrict the availability of knowledge,
skill and material by allowing recovery based on liability without fault.”).
267. Zichichi v. Middlesex Memorial Hosp., 528 A.2d 805, 810 (Conn. 1987); see also
Kozup, 663 F. Supp. at 1059; Garvey v. St. Elizabeth Hosp., 697 P.2d 248, 249 (Wash.
1985) (“The public policy represented by these statutes is not difficult to discern: blood
transfusions are essential in the medical area . . . .”).
268. See, e.g., Ryan v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 815 P.2d 528, 537 (Kan. 1991) (“A
condemnation proceeding is a sober inquiry into values, designed to strike a just balance
between the economic interests of the public and those of the landowner.”).
269. See Brandon, supra note 2, at 43 (noting that defection of Florida and New York
to majority view “is likely to influence the remaining courts across the country”).
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consumers.270 Therefore, courts should adhere to the majority
view and hold that as long as it is established that the public’s
fear diminishes property value, the loss is compensable. If situa-
tions arise where the balance tips against the property owner and
in favor of great societal interests, courts or legislatures can cre-
ate exceptions to the general rule. Thus, strict liability analysis
demonstrates that between the innocent property owner and the
better-equipped power company, courts should hold the latter re-
sponsible for market devaluation of property caused by the pub-
lic’s fear of power lines.
                                                                                                             
270. The majority view is the correct result for another reason. It imposes the loss
upon the general public, which not only receives the benefit of electricity from power lines,
but also whose fear (unfounded or not) ultimately results in the devaluation of the land-
owner’s property. Cf. Willsey v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 631 P.2d 268, 277-78
(Kan. Ct. App. 1981) (“[W]e see no reason why the landowner should bear the loss rather
than the customers for whose benefit the loss is inflicted.”).
